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Abstract—Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) fleets are becom-
ing more apparent in both military and civilian applications.
However security of these systems still remains unsatisfactory
if a strong adversary model with a high attack potential (i.e. the
adversary has capabilities and knowledge to capture a UAV, to
perform side-channel or fault injection or other physical, soft-
ware or combined attacks in order to gain access to some secret
data like cryptographic keys, mission plan, etc.) is considered.
The aim of this position paper is to draw security requirements
for this kind of adversaries and to propose theoretical solutions
based on an embedded Secure Element (SE) that could help
to accommodate these requirements. Finally, our proposal on
how to use these SEs to secure Autonomous UAVs fleets is
presented.
1. INTRODUCTION
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) are increasingly used
in military and civilian applications. For instance, in the
civilian applications they can be used for monitoring forest
fires, searching missing people in avalanches, etc. However,
most of UAVs being small and light they cannot be equipped
with heavy equipments (e.g. heavy sensors or many sen-
sors at the same time). Therefore, as illustrated Fig. 1,
UAVs often embed very few dedicated sensors and they
have to collaborate together and fly in a swarm to provide
all the features. Swarm formation helps simple UAVs to
collectively form a complex multi-feature fleet; however, if
there is no redundancy in the fleet it might become heavily
dependent of each and every UAV of the fleet. In addition
flying in swarm is helpful and efficient to cover a larger
geographic area for the aforementioned applications. Such
flights require a collaboration between UAVs which lead
them to communicate in a way similar to Mobile Ad hoc
Network (MANet) or Delay/Disruptive Tolerant Network
(DTN) and as a result become exposed to the same security
concerns.
In some contexts (like the civilian applications) security
issues might not be of high significance or their exploitation
might not have a high impact. However, in military appli-
cations it is crucial to address them. For instance UAVs
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Figure 1. Example of an Autonomous UAVs Fleet.
need to securely store data like flight-plan for the mission,
photos, coordinates of points of interest (enemies or allies)
which are invaluable assets for an opponent. Similarly to
avoid attacks at network level, routing (if applicable) must
be secured. Nevertheless among all of the potential security
problems, capture of UAV will be particularly discussed in
this paper. The Fig. 2 illustrates the interests for an attacker
that will be described in section 2.
1.1. Contribution
In this paper, our main focus is on the enhancement of
the security of UAVs fleets. The salient contributions of this
paper are as follows:
1) discussion on the adversary model for UAVs fleets;
2) definition of a list of security requirements, which
are derived from functional requirements and ad-
dress the relevant adversary model;
3) proposals of candidate Secure Elements (SE) that
can help a UAV to support the identified functional
and security requirements;
4) comparison with existing works that proposed the
deployment of “secure elements” on unmanned ve-
hicles;
5) proposal to secure autonomous UAVs fleets using
the proposed SEs.
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Figure 2. Interests of an attacker.
1.2. Structure of the Paper
Section 2 discusses the strong adversary model that we
consider for UAV fleets. In section 3, we list the require-
ments that a UAV equipped with a SE should satisfy to
address the defined adversary model and we present a list
of candidates for the SEs. Section 4 compares our proposal
with the related work. The proposal to secure autonomous
UAVs fleets using the proposed SEs is presented section 5
Then section 6 presents our future works for implementing
our proposal along with our concluding remarks.
2. ADVERSARY MODEL
In this paper we consider a strong adversary model
with a high attack potential. For instance the adversary has
capabilities and knowledge to capture a UAV, to perform
side-channel or fault injection or other physical, software or
combined attacks in order to gain access to (or to modify
for his profit) some secret data (e.g. cryptographic keys),
software or hardware.
2.1. Capture of UAV by an Attacker
In this section we assume that the attacker can capture
a UAV that is in functional state (i.e. there is no difference
between the captured UAV and one in flight). It means that
if there are self destruction mechanisms like the ones we
will mention in section 4 the attacker is able to bypass
or deactivate them. Even worst the attacker might perform
attacks during the flight1.
2.2. Attacks on a “Captured” UAV
Once a UAV is captured, the opponent can perform
various well-known attacks studied and applied during past
decades mainly in the world of smart cards. Even if a
smart card (under its different form factors) is considered
without any doubt, one of the most secure devices which
runs successfully in the worst adversary conditions (where
even its owner can be malicious), it has been and is still
subject to very advanced attacks like:
• Side-channel attacks [15], [18], [33], [51], [54].
This kind of blackbox attacks consists in observing
some information leakage from algorithms running
on the target. From these leakages, different kinds
of information can be retrieved (e.g. cryptographic
keys [44], sequence of opcodes executed [63]).
The nature of leakages can be time-based [43],
the power consumption with several families of
attacks (Simple Power Analysis [44], Differential
Power Analysis [44], High-Order Differential Power
Analysis [48], Corellation Power Analysis [24]), the
electromagnetic radiations with the same declination
of families of attacks (Simple Electromagnetic Anal-
ysis [36], [56], Differential Electromagnetic Anal-
ysis [5], [36], High-Order Differential Electromag-
netic Analysis, Corellation Electromagnetic Analy-
sis) or combination of different sources [6], [65].
There also exist some other powerful attacks using
side-channels like Template-Attacks [25], [57].
• Fault injection attacks [16], [22], [37], [38], [45],
[60]. This kind of attacks consists in perturbing, usu-
ally during a short time, the execution of a process
for instance by using a laser or voltage glitches to
reach a state the attacker can take advantage of. For
instance, using fault injection at the right time on
a RSA signature process, an attacker can recover
very quickly the private key used [22] in exploiting
the erroneous signatures delivered by the blackbox
system signing the message. With Differential Fault
Analysis, secret key cryptosystems like DES [21] or
AES [35] are also vunerable.
• Physical attacks [45], [59]. This kind of attacks
encompasses microprobing, circuitery modification
with a Focused Ion Beam system or a laser cuter,
etc.
• Software attacks. This kind of attacks is highly
dependent on the possibility to load applications on
the target. The loading can be or not protected by an
1. It is important to underline that the operating attacks mentioned in
section 2.2 on a flying UAV (even if it should not be easy) are equivalent
to have captured the UAV.
authentication mechanism (but it can still be circum-
vented by another attack). However, if application
loading is possible, it can be feasible to perform
and sometime achieve some attacks from inside the
target against other hosted applications or against the
platform of the target [31], [50].
• Combined attacks [17], [64]. These attacks often
combine fault injection during execution of a code
loaded or already present in the target to alter the
application execution in order to gain additional
access priviledges.
These attacks are not only applicable to smart card but also
to any processor [15], [18], [38], [54], [61] and thus to a
UAV.
2.3. Attacks on a UAV in a Network
At the best of our knowledge, there is no paper specif-
ically addressing attacks that a UAV can be subjected to
through the network in a fleet or a swarm. We thus consider
that the adversary can perform similar attacks to those
existing in MANets, DTN and Wireless Sensors Networks.
In particular, the attacker can perform the easiest attacks on
a wireless link: a Denial-of-Service (DoS) [66]. This attack
can be achieved:
• at the physical level by interfering on radio frequen-
cies used by the UAVs (jamming attack);
• at the link level by exploiting the medium access
control backoff and retransmission procedures (col-
lision attacks);
• at the network level by using routing loop at-
tacks [47];
• at the transport level using a flooding attack or a
desynchronization attack [34].
If communications are not ciphered, the opponent can
perform eavesdropping, packet injection or corruption and
he can even attempt Man-in-the-Middle or relay attacks.
The attacker can also build a rogue UAV to attempt some
attacks on routing protocols [23], [32], [41] like: blackhole
attack, selective forwarding attack, sinkhole attack, rushing
attack, sybil attack, wormhole attack, etc.
Some application specific attacks can also be performed
but they are beyond the scope of this paper.
2.4. Rationale for the Adversary Model
In recent work, some academic researchers have done a
Correlation Power Analysis [49] on Virtex-4 and Virtex-5
family, i.e. Xilinx FPGAs that are widely used in UAVs (in-
cluding the Predator [67]). They shown that the encryption
mechanism can be completely broken with moderate effort.
Thus, a strong adversary model makes sense, especially in
the context of military usage of UAVs fleets since the oppo-
nent can be a government-controlled organization capable
of performing forensic analysis or attacks of the UAVs.
The reader should note that for all of the aforementioned
attacks there are corresponding countermeasures which are
well known to the industry and academia. The counter-
measures that are implemented must not impact the real
time capacities of the UAV, especially regarding its auto-
pilot and its responsiveness to external, GPS and Inertial
Measurement Unit (IMU) events. It is even more important
because we are considering fleets of UAVs and not a single
UAV.
3. REQUIREMENTS
This section describes the functional requirements that
a UAV equiped with a SE should satisfy. Thereafter, based
on the functional requirements and adversary model, we
stipulate the security requirements.
3.1. Functional Requirements
For a wide adoption, UAVs fleets should satisfy some
functional requirements.
• (FR1) The fleet should be autonomous and should
not rely on communication with its base/user to
be more stealthy in the adversary conditions of the
mission (e.g. intensive long RF communication with
the base may be easier to locate than short range
communication between UAVs).
• (FR2) The fleet should be easy and transparent to
manage both in terms of functionality and security
and management should be possible prior or during
the fleet operations. For instance, at a scheduling
step, the user just needs to define the mission she
wishes the fleet to perform. Then, when rescheduling
the mission is needed, (for instance if user wants to
include new objectives like new measurements from
embedded sensors), the update of the mission may
be done during the refuelling in energy (e.g. in air
from more powerful UAVs) or with new UAVs join-
ing the current fleet to transmit the new mission. In
addition, the user should not have to worry about the
underlying security architecture for communication
and management of the fleet.
• (FR3) The fleet should be reliable. It means that each
UAV can have a dedicated mission but, if needed,
for some reasons (e.g. failure, too low energy level
to achieve the mission), it may decide to entrust its
mission to another UAV according to the capabilities
in term of equipments (e.g. sensors) and software
stack of this UAV.
• (FR4) A UAVs fleet has to perform optimally in the
adversely territories/environments. It thus must be
able to analyze the situation and make decisions in
real-time. Therefore, any hardware included in the
system should not incur unnecessary performance
penalties.
From these requirements, it means that the fleet should be
self-organized and should be equipped with some sort of
swarm intelligence.
3.2. Security Requirements
According to the adversary model defined in section 2
and from the functional requirements defined above, UAVs
of the fleet should satisfy the following security require-
ments.
• (SR1) The UAV should be SE-driven to ensure se-
curity and privacy of its missions. In addition, the
security architecture of the UAV system should not
incur performance penalties. Therefore, any proposal
for the UAV system should be robust and optimal
in both security and performance — preserving a
real-time processing environment with high level of
assurance.
• (SR2) The whole UAV should be tamper resistant,
or at least a part of it (the SE).
• (SR3) The UAV should provide assurance in imple-
mented security mechanisms to its user. For instance
it, or more precisely its SE, has to be subjected to
a security evaluation and certification to prove that
it can resist an attacker compliant with the strong
adversary model defined above. The certification can
be Common Criteria evaluation [2] with a minimum
in the Evaluation Assurance Level of EAL4+, where
‘+’ means ‘augmented’ with security assurance re-
quirement component AVA VAN5 (i.e. the highest
assurance component of the vulnerabilities analysis
family of the vulnerability assessment class).
• (SR4) The UAV at a very basic level should provide
a secure unique ID on which the whole fleet can rely
for its management and networking operations.
• (SR5) The UAV should provide secure key man-
agement and crytographic features to protect com-
munication integrity and confidentiality among the
members of the fleet.
• (SR6) UAV should provide a secure storage for data
collected (e.g. measurements, photos) and/or those
used for the purpose of the mission (e.g. flight-plan
for the mission, coordinates of points of interest).
• (SR7) The UAV should provide a secure multi
application platform. This requirement is justified
since in the context of SE-driven UAV there will be
installation of new applications (for new purposes
according to FR2) or transfer of applications be-
tween UAVs (when an entrustment of a mission from
a deficient UAV to another one occurs according
to FR3). Update of already embedded applications
containing flaws with new versions covering the
threats can even occur. This SR facilitates a scalable
and flexible design, where new sensors can be added
to individual UAVs depending upon the mission and
the associated sensor management application can
then be loaded onto the SE. Note that installation or
update can occur for instance during air refuelling.
An additional functional requirement may be optionally
added if the context of SE-driven UAV is accepted: (FR5)
the SE may have its own communication capabilities to
communicate with other SEs which can form an overlay
network (for specific control operations) parallel to the one
that already exists between UAVs (i.e. the SE can communi-
cate with its own RF communication module operating with
a dedicated part of the RF spectrum).
These requirements define a secure Machine to Machine
(M2M) platform over a fleet of UAVs.
3.3. Candidate Secure Elements
In this section, we present several candidates for the SE.
As none of them is satisfying all of the requirements defined
above, we are defining our SE, that we will develop in our
future activities.
3.3.1. Wireless Sensor Node. A Wireless Sensor Node
(WSN) has communicating capabilities that would satisfy
FR5. However as it has been shown in [32], in its current
“form” a WSN cannot be the SE because in case of capture
it fails to satisfy SR2 to SR7 and thus SR1. However it
should be noted that some work is in progress to design,
evaluate and certified WSN in very specific contexts [19],
[20] or to add to it a Trusted Platform Module (that is a
candidate for being a SE discussed below) to enhance its
own security [40].
3.3.2. Trusted Platform Module. A Trusted Platform Mod-
ule (TPM) is an interesting candidate since it can partially
satisfy SR2 to SR6. TPM may fail to satisfy SR3 for which
the device has to provide an assurance of its own security.
Indeed there is no compulsory requirement that a TPM has
to be subjected to security evaluation and certification. Since
in the traditional deployments, TPMs are going through the
security evaluation, they are intrinsically considered to be
trusted and secure. Therefore, they are used to provide a
trusted measurement of the individual applications and Op-
erating System (OS). However, a TPM itself cannot verify
whether an application or the OS is secure or not. This
decision has to be taken by the user based on the (trusted)
integrity measurement provided by the TPM. Similarly, the
TPM partially satisfies the SR6 as it does have small (secure)
storage but mostly for cryptographic material. The TPM
storage can potentially be increased or data can be stored in
encrypted form outside the TPM where the encryption key
remains securely stored. However, the later scheme will only
incur additional computational requirements, thus adding
performance penalties. However it cannot execute code, thus
it fails to satisfy SR1, and SR7. As the UAVs fleet, once in
a mission, should not be constantly required to provide state
attestations by the base station or peer UAVs because it will
incur unnecessary performance penalty violating both FR1
and FR4. Including a TPM will only be useful if the UAVs
fleet is grounded, or in instances where the base station
requires to verify the state of the system before the mission
starts. In addition, since a TPM does not have standalone
decision capabilities it would fail to satisfy FR3 and FR5.
3.3.3. Smart Card. Smart cards are designed with a strong
adversary model in mind which assumes that they are in
the possession of a potentially malicious user. Under such
an adversarial model, the smart cards are required to provide
a secure and trusted execution environment. Therefore, the
smart card platform has a matured architecture that can
adequately support the functional and security requirements
given in the previous sections. As a result, smart cards
intrinsically support SR2 to SR6.
To comprehensively support SR7, the ownerhip model
for the deployment of smart card based SE in UAV
should support User Centric Smart Card Ownership Model
(UCOM) [9] which provides a dynamic, scalable and flexi-
ble architecture for multi-application platforms. In addition,
the UCOM proposal of Trusted Execution and Environment
Manager (TEM) [14] has the potential to provide a strong
trusted device and (application) execution architecture. Fur-
thermore, UCOM based smart cards also support remote
attestation and validation mechanims [8], [12], [13] along
with a secure architecture for application migration [11]
between different smart cards.
For a collaborative and dynamic capability to reassign
resources to accomplish a mission (FR3), the UCOM based
smart card architecture provides a solid foundation as per
the proposal for a secure and trusted application sharing
mechanism between two or more smart cards [10]. Thus the
UCOM smart card with TEM has all qualities to withstand
SR1. Although, it can be argued that smart cards do not pos-
sess the RF communication capabilities, such a functionality
can be built around it as a standalone module.
3.3.4. Active RFID. Active RFID are difficult to categorize
because a mobile phone could be considered as a long range
RFID with additional functionalities (by the way it can also
be considered as a big WSN). In our vision, we are more
considering as Active RFID devices like the OpenBeacon
Tag [1] but with a secure chip.
However, even if there exist some active RFIDs (e.g.
remote control keys for cars), initial experiments seem to
show they are vulnerable to several attacks [42], [53]. How-
ever, it must take into account the active RFIDs studied
are necessarily vulnerable because they are not designed to
withstand a high potential attack.
At best, current Active RFIDs are only supporting SR4,
SR5 and FR5.
3.3.5. Our proposal. Our proposal of SE consists in bring-
ing together the best of active RFID, WSN and smart card in
what can be called an Active Radio Frequency Smart Secure
Device (ARFSSD) to address the only features that the smart
card fails to satisfy: the optional FR5. Then ARFSSD would
then satisfy all the above requirements.
As illustrated in figure 3 our first prototype will be based
on an ARM-based platform as the ubiquitous Raspberry Pi
embedding Linux and the PC/SC middleware to support
a smart card reader. These components will only serve
to interface between the UCOM smart card and the RF
communication module that we will use. The dotted line
represents communication level between the smart card and
the RF communication module whereas the plain arrows
represent the real communications between the different
subsystems of the prototype. We have not yet decided which
Figure 3. An overview of the future prototype of our Active Radio Fre-
quency Smart Secure Device
RF communication module we will use since making a final
decision requires to run some experimentations. However we
have in mind, the NRF24L01 from Nordic Semicondutor,
the Xbee module (a ZigbBee implementation) from Digi
International or the Wifly module (a Wi-Fi implementation)
from Roving Networks.
3.3.6. Summary. As shown in table 1, smart card is actually
the most serious candidate. However, ARFSSD should fullfil
the only missing smart card functional requirement to be the
ultimate solution.
TABLE 1. REQUIREMENTS FULLFILLED BY THE CANDIDATE SE
SR1 SR2 SR3 SR4 SR5 SR6 SR7 FR5
WSN x
TPM x x x x x
Smart Card x x x x x x x
Active RFID x x x
Our proposal x x x x x x x x
4. RELATED WORK
There is very little work in publicly available literature
related to the security of identity in fleets of UAVs. This
must be explored further because it is on the security of data
involved in the authentication mechanisms that the trust for
future transactions between UAVs (data exchange, routing
in the cases where it is used, etc.) relies. In security architec-
tures for fleets of UAVs supporting group communications
(e.g. [55]) or collaborative work (e.g. [58]), the possibility
of an attacker with high attack potential (i.e. for instance
being able to physically access a UAV after its capture)
is almost never considered. In the few studies considering
this kind of attacker model, the physical security of the
elements used to support identification, i.e. the heart of
security, is relegated to the assumptions on the equipment
used or additional countermeasures such as self-destruction
of the UAV [46], [68]. However attacks can occur during
flights which can defeat the physical protection. The only
papers that actually consider to protect the identifiers are
those initiated by Chaumette et al. through the use of Java
Card [26], [27]. Some other papers [28], [39] are considering
a secure token (i.e. a smart card) in swarms of UAVs but
without giving details except it is used to securely store
some data and perform some ciphering operations.
Since our proposal of ARFSSD can be seen as an
extension of these works through the use of active RFIDs, it
is interesting to survey the use of RFIDs in nearby contexts.
In the area of fleets of robots, passive RFIDs are used to
make a sort of communication between robots for the allo-
cation of tasks [62] or for synchronization [69]. However, in
no case these papers address any security concerns. Other
papers related to the use of RFIDs for UAVs include an
inventory of goods with a UAV carrying a RFID reader in
a warehouse [4] or an hypothetical future RFID injection
under the skin of people with cyber insects [3] which is far
from our concerns.
5. TOWARD SECURE AUTONOMOUS
UAVS FLEETS
In a common standalone UAV fleet, as depicted Fig. 4,
when the application (1) on the UAV A sends a message
to application (3) on UAV C, the message is routed by the
UAV B to C, since C is outside of the A’s radio coverage,
and is, thus, not reachable. However, even if UAVs are in
the same fleet, it might be possible to consider that different
UAVs have different privileges and that some information
(even like the destination, for instance for privacy reasons)
should not be accessed by some intermediary UAVs.
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Figure 4. A standalone UAV fleet.
Our solution, depicted in Fig. 5, using the proposed
secure elements embedded on each UAVs enables to ensure
kind of security properties since, for instance, the destination
address can be ciphered and the deciphering process is done
in the secure element which will decide if the message is for
its UAV or if it must be forwarded. Indeed, altogether these
secure elements build a control network layer providing high
level of security for any exchanges in the network. They also
offer security services (like cryptography, secure storage and
processing capabilities) to the application layer. Thus, they
satisfy all the security requirements drawn in section 3 for
any missions requiring a high level of security.
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Figure 5. UAV fleet using proposed security elements.
6. FUTURE WORKS AND CONCLUSIONS
From the requirements listed in section 3, we are still
developing a first prototype of ARFSSD as a Secure Element
for UAVs fleets. It is interesting to observe that UAVs fleets
equipped with our SE, like the one presented in section 5,
raise problems close to those we are addressing in other
contexts (e.g. Multilevel Mobile Java Card Grid [29], [30]
and multilevel, secure (smart card), communication based
services on a fleet of mobile phones [52]). Based on our
experience in these areas, our next step will be to develop
such a UAVs fleet to perform some practical tests.
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